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Abstract. The culture of consumer capitalism encourages authentic individualism 
on the one hand, but, on the other, also promotes the tendency towards 
conformity. “Identity”, has never been so “fashionable”. Consumer society allows 
us to change identities in an instant and, as a result, any identity we assume is 
subjected to a constant onslaught of scepticism and uncertainty. Consumerism 
puts at our disposal such a wide range of possible identities as the whole question 
of identity seem almost arbitrary. In this article, I will examine various examples 
of simulated identity, as expressed in the paintings of the contemporary artist 
Chaya Agur. The discussion on the role of the “mask”, as “persona” will be 
critical. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The social group is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it gives 
us a frame of belonging and provides us with womblike protection 
and a sense of security; on the other hand, it deprives us of the 
independence, uniqueness, and richness of being alone (Fromm 
1977). Belonging and fitting in with others is important to us for 
survival and, therefore, the rise of the individual as distinct from the 
tribe throughout the cultural history of the West has created 
conscious tension between the individual and society. 
Although scholarly consensus credits the Renaissance with the 
birth of modern individualism in the West (see Burckhardt 1944), in 
the sense of humanity emerging from a state of pre-unitary existence 
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to a state of full self-awareness of the human being as a distinct 
entity (Fromm 1977; Debord 1995), we must insist, along the lines 
laid out by Shanahan (1992), that the Renaissance saw the renewal 
– rather than the invention – of individualism and humanism. There 
is evidence of personality being viewed as distinct throughout the 
Middle Ages (see for example Arbel 2002); in fact, signs of 
individualism can be traced as far back as antiquity.  
Since the advent of individualism in its modern incarnation, 
human beings have become freer, but also lonelier. Many are still 
willing to sacrifice their privacy, liberty, independence, and right to 
free thought and self-determination, all for the sake of a perceived 
sense of identity and belonging to the herd, rather than suffer 
loneliness (Fromm 1977). Humans are constantly in search of 
simulated identity, argues Sartre, out of the fear of singularity – they 
are creatures of the masses. No matter how low he has to stop, man 
will take every measure so as not to stand out from the crowd, else 
he might find himself facing his own image (Sartre 1956). 
Individualism is generally considered a central component of 
Western culture (Huntington 1997). Nevertheless, despite the value 
attached to individualism, people cannot completely separate 
themselves from the collective consciousness, for only in relation to 
the social framework can they understand their world and 
themselves. Therefore, the struggle to become a self-conscious 
being with a high level of personal and social awareness often 
generates significant tension between the individual and society. In 
fact, we could say that an individual is a person who sees themselves 
as responsible for analysing and privately or publically reformulating 
the basic scientific, political and sociological assumptions they are 
exposed to. This person’s individual stances are not necessarily 
aligned with the precepts of their social group and they might agree 
with society’s political and religious worldviews or, on the contrary, 
oppose them (Raby 2009). However, even a self-aware mind has, 
according to Jung, unconscious underpinnings. The individual never 
exists as an entirely separate entity; we are social creatures, and 
therefore, the mind is as much a collective as an individual 
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phenomenon (Jung 1916).  
With the democratization of political regimes in the West, a 
process which has anchored anthropocentrism as the dominant 
worldview in Western culture, the question arises whether 
individualism is a true expression of freedom, allowing each person 
to fully experience their uniqueness; or whether it is a mere illusion, 
an example of wishful thinking, or an unconscious mask we do to 
protect ourselves from loneliness. In today’s capitalist society, with 
social networks giving us endless possibilities for self-expression, 
the individual claims to strive towards self-actualization. Eva Illouz 
argues that we are, in fact, actualizing a kind of “generalized self” 
that is not really us. The culture of consumer capitalism encourages 
authentic individualism, but at the same time promotes a tendency 
towards conformity. “Identity” has never been so “fashionable”. 
Consumer society allows us to change identities in an instant and, as 
a result, any identity we assume is subjected to a constant onslaught 
of scepticism and uncertainty. Consumerism puts at our disposal 
such a wide range of possible identities as the whole question of 
identity seem almost arbitrary (Illouz 2002). In this article, I will 
examine various examples of simulated identity, focusing on the role 
of the “mask” (the image we strive to present to the world) as a 
shield against loneliness – as expressed in the paintings of 
contemporary artist Chaya Agur.  
 
 
LONELINESS, THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 
 
Loneliness is generally perceived as a psychological state of sadness 
and melancholy due to a lack of company. Robert Weiss points out 
that loneliness is not caused by one’s state of solitude, but by a life 
that lacks fulfilling social relationships (Weiss 1975). Loneliness is a 
subjective experience that is not paramount to social isolation; 
rather it stems from a deficiency in the individual’s social 
connections. Solitude can be good when it is intermittent, when this 
private domain exists alongside friendship ties, when it does not take 
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over a person’s life but is rather a coveted and voluntarily chosen 
part of it.  
In contrast, Schopenhauer takes the extreme view, ignoring our 
social need to belong and presenting solitude in a positive light: in 
his eyes, only when man is alone can he be wholly himself. Man is 
only free when he is alone. From this radical position, Schopenhauer 
views social man as dull-witted, spiritually sterile, and boorish 
(Schopenhauer 1969).  
Nietzsche is another avid proponent of extensive solitude. To 
lead a full inner life, one has to retire from the herd into 
individuality: “Would you go into isolation, my brother? Would you 
seek the way to yourself?” (Nietzsche 2003, 47). However, the way 
to the self is anything but straightforward: “But the worst enemy 
you can meet will always be yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in 
caves and forests… You must be willing to burn in your own flame: 
how could you become new unless you had first become ashes?” 
(48–49). 
Unlike Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who disregard the social 
need to belong and instead advocate creative solitude, Spinoza 
argues that the worthy life is one that maintains an equilibrium 
between the two. As long as man inhabits the solitary realm of the 
self while belonging in parallel to the realm of the many, taking 
responsibility for his actions, operating out of full awareness, and 
leading productive, collaborative, and creative discourse with his 
social group, his solitude will be a tonic to him, with no loss of 
freedom or identity (Harpaz 2013).  
Like Spinoza, Russell teaches that a proper balance must be 
found between belonging and separateness, or aloneness, rather 
than a clear-cut decision in favour of one or the other. He writes 
that human life must contain a wide space which is ruled by what is 
known as the “herd instinct”, but it also must delimit a narrow space 
where this instinct is barred from entering (Russell 1996). This 
narrow space belongs to the private domain. It is not only an 
intellectual domain but also a physical and emotional one. Only 
through the fully led “me-life”, through the hours of aloneness and 
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separateness, through opening up to the rich spheres of existence, 
through creativity and imagination, through personal pleasures of 
the body and the mind – only through these can man glimpse the 
full scope of his personality, and with it the need to discover and 
fulfil himself. 
In summary, just as individuals need the public domain in 
numerous aspects of their lives, they also need the private domain 
for other aspects. However, the encounter with the other is also 
important for the creation of the individual self. Emanuel Levinas 
emphasizes the importance of this relationship between individual 
and society for self-development. He defines the self as a 
subjectivity, as a subject, an “I”, precisely because it is exposed to 
the other (Levinas 1986). In his conception, it is impossible to create 
a deep bond of sharing and openness with the other unless we 
undertake the voyage into the depths of our own souls (Levinas and 
Melville 1978). The process of revealing one’s self to the other is 
accompanied by discomfort and sometimes pain. The other is not 
just another person located outside of the self, but the internalized 
other who resides in the hidden regions of the I-experience. The 
interaction created between the “I” and the “other” begins with 
recognizing the “I” as an individual, as the self. The general 
mechanism through which the self can develop is reflexive – it is the 
ability to examine one’s self through the eyes of others (Hollis 1993; 
Ritzer and Goodman 2003).  
Existentialism, on the other hand, tends to regard the tension 
between individual and society as a healthy one that we as humans 
must learn to navigate, a tension between our cultural heritage and 
our capacity to reflect upon it with a critical eye (Strenger 2010). 
Human individuality is the result of internalizing these tensions and 
attempting to live them in a fulfilling and meaningful way. 
Nevertheless, the reflexivity essential to the individual’s 
development is often accompanied by shame, anxiety, and struggle, 
which may lead to self-alienation, disingenuousness, and an 
unhealthy dependence on the “mask”. 
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THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY AND THE MASK 
 
Jung utilizes the term “persona”, which in Latin designated a 
theatrical mask, to refer to the social face that an individual presents 
to the world. The persona, he argues, is but a fragment of the 
collective mind that one puts on (and struggles to remove) in order 
to create a false impression of individuality. The persona is not real 
– it is a compromise between the individual and the way society 
dictates a person should appear (Jung 1916). People rely on the mask 
of the persona to play their social role. The mask allows them to be 
part of society and to escape loneliness. Similarly, existentialist 
philosophy deals with self-alienation and the masks that individuals 
don in society out of shame and out of fear of the gaze of the other, 
as Sartre illustrates in his play No Exit (1989). 
Jung warns against overreliance on the persona device, which 
could lead to the loss of an individual’s true personality in favour of 
their persona. That individual risks being swallowed up by this 
simulated image and becoming an artificial being, a victim of his 
own undoing. Those who are too good at fabricating their persona 
doom themselves to living with a conflicted soul (Jung 1916). From 
early childhood we learn to wear masks, to hide our true or imagined 
weaknesses in order to protect ourselves from rejection by others. 
Although at times we might mistake our persona for our true selves, 
just a passing glimpse of what’s behind the mask elicits a sense of 
meaning. Such revelations can happen when we take the time to 
look inwards, when we are exposed to the ideas of great thinkers or 
even during an honest conversation with another individual (Cohen 
2005). These revelations relate to our inner strength: the more we 
learn to see individuality as an expression of our uniqueness, the 
more we can become ourselves.  
The mask also protects us from the fear of emptiness and 
meaninglessness. This cold shadow of existential dread sometimes 
manifests itself as a loss of interest in life, brought on by such causes 
as a crisis of faith, a shattered dream or a romantic breakup. The 
sense of emptiness hangs over and threatens our existence (Tillich 
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1952, ch. 2). One of the ways of escaping this void is to assume an 
identity, a protective persona that gradually solidifies and becomes 
permanent. According to Jeansen, as long as the social “actor” 
wearing an artificial mask is aware they are playing a role, everything 
is ostensibly fine. However, if the person underneath forgets that 
the mask is a fiction, they will no longer be able to fully grasp or 
fulfil themselves, and over time will come to realize their 
fundamental loneliness and – even more so – their falseness 
(Jeansen 1960). 
 
 
THE MASK IN THE PAINTINGS OF CHAYA AGUR 
 
Art, according to Nietzsche, protects man from existential dread 
and the horror of dealing with an absurd reality. The artistic act is 
also the mark of the authentic person – the one who inhabits, 
creates, and refines themselves. In this act of creating one’s self, the 
creator and the work merge and there is no more distance between 
them. The role of art is therefore not merely to imitate nature or 
reality, but to serve as a metaphysical complement to this reality and 
to overcome it (Nietzsche 1999). Similarly, Marcuse views art as 
having the power to negate the given reality; as such, it has an 
important place in the expression of social criticism, one of the 
drivers of individual consciousness. This recognizes the political 
potential of art: any authentic work of art constitutes a questioning 
of perception and understanding, a denunciation of institutionalized 
reality, and therefore could be considered revolutionary. The 
negation Marcuse speaks of is, in fact, the contrast between the 
autonomous world of art and the existing reality (Marcuse 1977). 
The “Masks” series, produced by painter Chaya Agur between 
2001 and 2004, addresses the intricate relationship between the 
individual’s inner personality and their social mask by exploring, 
with a critical eye, the wide variety of “masks” used in different 
social situations; they are in fact images of the “masks of the soul” 
donned by the individual (Jennings and Minde 1993). The mask, as 
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depicted in ten works from Agur’s “Masks” series, represents the 
simulated identity behind which the individual is hiding, having lost 
sight of their authentic identity. Through these works, Agur issues 
criticism of contemporary society and cautions against overusing the 
persona device, which, echoing Jung’s warning, could cause us to 
lose our true personality and become an artificial being. 
 
 
“Expensive Hat”, collage and oil paints, 30x40 
 
This painting depicts a woman whose face is partially obscured by 
the titular “expensive hat”, representing capitalism. The image 
criticizes the overabundance of identities proffered to us in the age 
of consumerism – identity becomes yet another product for people 
to consume. In some senses, individualism too has fallen victim to 
the influence of the identity market in which the “I” is traded like 
so many other consumer goods (Strenger 2010, 42). The person 
becomes a brand, and identity becomes a “false need” that the 
person assimilates without even realizing it. In his critique of 
consumerist ideology in the capitalist age, Marcuse argues that 
manufacturers no longer address people’s real needs; instead, 
advertising creates the illusion of necessity in order to persuade 
people to buy products they do not actually need. These “false 
needs” perpetuate injustice, aggression, wastefulness, and obsession 
with work. They prevent change from happening because change is 
only driven by real needs (Marcuse [1964] 2006, ch. 1).  
These needs have societal content and function, and it does not 
matter how much they have been internalized by the individual, nor 
how much that person truly identifies with them or finds personal 
fulfilment in their satisfaction – “they continue to be what they were 
from the beginning—products of a society whose dominant interest 
demands repression”(7). In the past, Marcuse contends, human 
freedom was limited by a lack of means to satisfy basic needs. 
Nowadays, however, just as the exercise of freedom is so readily 
within reach, it is curbed by the framework of modern capitalist 
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society, which manages to suppress even the potential of liberation. 
When there is no true critical dimension, man finds himself living a 
“one-dimensional” existence. “One-dimensional” denotes a 
situation in which negation is rooted out of the forces that are 
supposed to oppose the existing system. For all intents and 
purposes, it consists of the disappearance of the private, subjective 
dimension (12–13). The “one-dimensional” man is trapped in a state 
of false consciousness and in the race for social success and 
achievement. 
Horkheimer and Adorno also see the race for external capitalist 
success as today’s only measure of self-existence. They maintain that 
the agencies of cultural production are particularly adept at 
impressing “standardized behaviour on the individual as the only 
natural, decent, and rational one. Individuals define themselves now 
only as things, statistical elements, successes or failures” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 21). Slavoj Zizek presents an even 
more extreme position with regard to the individual’s behaviour in 
capitalist society. In his view, today’s accepted cultural norms have 
a tinge of social imperative that can sometimes border on the 
totalitarian. “You can” becomes “you must”, an imperative that 
ignores true needs and demands compliance (Zizek 2000, 44). By 
choosing not to follow the norms, which have become totalitarian, 
the individual may pay the heavy price of social loneliness and 
therefore prefers to adopt the accepted values – represented in the 
painting as a hat made of banknotes – at the cost of losing identity 
(the faceless woman). 
 
 
“Variations on Zoomorphism” (Cow-man), black and white drawing (46x33) 
 
This humorous study by Agur is the visual interpretation of the 
literary device of “zoomorphism” – or “rhinomorphism” as it 
appears in Eugène Ionesco’s Rhinocéros ([1962] 2014), a play that 
focuses on the scientifically proven phenomenon of conformity 
(Allen and Levine 1969). Ionesco expresses his dread of ideological 
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conformity by presenting it in its extreme with his theatre of the 
absurd. The play portrays a society that causes people to voluntarily 
relinquish independent thought, to assimilate in order to belong 
rather than feel excluded. Agur, in turn, presents a visual criticism 
of this modern herd mentality. Conformism can cause a person with 
a “human” face – a face that represents humanist values – to 
undergo a gradual and imperceptible metamorphosis into a cow (or 
a rhino…). As Zizek warns, contemporary society, which is based 
on market forces rather than humanist values, can only move in the 
direction of easy, animal-like pleasures, and therefore its values are 
bound to degenerate (Zizek 2002). 
This criticism of the herd mentality is nothing new; it was already 
masterfully expressed by the Roman philosopher Lucius Seneca in 
the first century AD:  
 
You ask me to say what you should consider it particularly important to avoid. 
My answer is this: a mass crowd… I never come back home with quite the 
same moral character I went out with; something or other becomes unsettled 
where I had achieved internal peace, some one or other of the things I had 
put to flight reappears on the scene... Associating with people in large 
numbers is actually harmful... The larger the size of the crowd we mingle with, 
the greater the danger. (Seneca 1969, Letter VII) 
 
To retain a fragment of individuality, Seneca encourages us to 
embrace positive solitude and to withdraw from the crowd once in 
a while. He advises against following the crowd but also against 
despising the crowd, and suggests that we look inwards as much as 
possible and consort with people who have a positive effect on our 
virtues (Seneca 1969, Letter VII). 
This, then, raises the question of whether today, in the age of 
social networks, it is still possible to detach from the collective, 
“inclusive” element of our natures; and whether the possibility for 
individuals to define themselves separately from the herd still exists.  
For Eran Kimchi, social network users tend to believe it is 
possible to become fully acquainted with another person based on 
a concise list of their basic characteristics (Kimchi 2010). Today we 
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find ourselves in a new social state called “alone-together”. This is a 
social illusion which allows the individual to feel connected to 
society when in fact this connection is superficial and vague – a 
substitute for authentic and intimate interpersonal conversation. 
The individual chooses the precise extent to which they reveal 
themselves (Turkle 2011). 
 
 
“Every fisherman has his fish”, watercolours (40x50) 
 
This humorous visual criticism also relates to modern consumerism. 
The old adage “you are what you eat” is transformed into a 
metaphorical commentary on the consumption of social and 
cultural content. The “individual” chooses or “fishes” his food 
without realizing he is internalizing the “mask” of the thought habits 
he is taking in. The critique places the responsibility on the 
shoulders of the person who consumes content indiscriminately and 
internalizes it as if it had been self-created – social content becomes 
part of the person’s identity and a delusional shield against 
singularity and loneliness. The implication of this responsibility is 
best summarized by Sartre, for whom man is nothing but what he 
makes of himself. Man is free. Man is freedom (Sartre 1973).  
 
 
“Carnival”, oil on canvas 40x60 
 
In this diptych, both the woman and the man are dressed in 
Renaissance clothing. The eye masks they hold are typical of the 
Venetian carnival. When the masks are removed, they have no face 
– the eyes continue to look at the world through the perspective of 
the artificial persona. The masks, therefore, represent the element 
of the assumed persona – made to impress and meet social 
expectations. For Agur, the faceless figure behind the fixed, 
simulated identity of the mask is a recurring motif. The mask is 
personality, but it is also the illusion of identity, as revealed by Luigi 
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Pirandello in the series of plays entitled Naked Masks (1957). For the 
Italian playwright, man is always wearing a mask, without meaning 
to and without being aware of it, yet the mask itself is naked because 
nothing about it is real (Pirandello 2005). 
“Carnival” expresses the idea that society gives us the mask, but 
also the chance to escape by means of the carnival, an event 
celebrated all over the world. The carnival allows the individual to 
step out of their everyday personality in order to identify with that 
which they are not – it is a game in the theatre of life. The struggle 
for survival makes life oppressive, while the carnival offers relief 
from the stress of it all. It is liberation, Nietzsche’s Dionysus. The 
carnival in Venice and other places is not a religious holiday so much 
as it is a response to a human need. This temporary transformation 
of life into art corresponds to Nietzsche’s insistence that the 
principle of creativity is what gives life value (Nietzsche 1974). 
Cited by the Greeks as the dual-source for their art, Apollo and 
Dionysus represent opposing styles engaged in almost constant 
conflict: “In order to gain a closer understanding of these two 
drives, let us think of them in the first place as the separate art-
worlds of dream and intoxication. Between these two physiological 
phenomena, an opposition can be observed which corresponds to 
that between the Apolline and the Dionysiac” (Nietzsche 1999, 14–
15). Apollo is “the magnificent divine image” – the supreme truth, 
the god of true recognition (17). Dionysian art, in contrast, is based 
on fun, intoxication, and ecstasy: “we catch a glimpse of the essence 
of the Dionysiac, which is best conveyed by the analogy of 
intoxication. These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in 
intensity, cause subjectivity to vanish to the point of complete self-
forgetting” (17). 
 
 
“Body Language”, oil on canvas, 50x60 
 
In this painting, Agur explores the truth of the body as opposed to 
that of the conscious mind – the human body can express nature’s 
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“truth” even when our consciousness attempts to hide it. Our basic 
survival impulses, or the vulnerability of our subconscious when it 
feels threatened, express themselves in uncontrolled emotions such 
as anger, shame, and lack of confidence, all of which burst out into 
the open as “body language”, sometimes betraying the mask we 
wear on our faces. As Samy Molcho points out, we have control 
over our faces and our speech (for instance, we can smile while we 
are angry), but the body is the reflection of the soul and its language 
speaks from the heart. Our inner feelings, emotions, and desires are 
expressed through our bodies. We immediately respond physically 
to the difference between desired value and actual value without our 
conscious intervention. Molcho also notes that people from all 
walks of life and social circles react similarly, if not identically, to 
stimuli at the primal level of physical signals (Molcho 1985). This is 
unlike the persona, which varies across cultures, social classes and 
individual personalities. In the painting, this idea is expressed 
through the bodies depicted as the actual true “face” of the person, 
speaking its own language, while the faces on the couple’s heads are 
drooping, lifeless masks. Any real communication between the two 
takes place by way of their bodies.  
 
 
“The Mask as an Escape from the Other’s Gaze”, oil on canvas, 50x70 
 
The couple in the painting are acutely aware of the existence of the 
giant masks they are hiding behind. Their real identities are 
purposefully concealed at the moment of contact because they are 
afraid to reveal their true selves. As Jung has argued, the persona is 
a complicated relationship between individual consciousness and 
society, a kind of mask to impress those around us, on the one hand, 
and to hide our true natures, on the other (Jung 1916). Our intense 
desire to belong to the other in a meaningful relationship makes us 
afraid of revealing our true identities and causes us to hide behind a 
giant mask that we wield like a shield against loneliness. An egg – an 
emblematic and recurring symbol for the painter – is poised at the 
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top of each mask as a metaphor for the delicate balancing act 
required to prevent the fragile load from falling and breaking, while 
an additional egg between the two figures symbolizes the 
relationship they seek to found and fertilize. Both partake in the 
finest of social mannerisms, represented by the glass of wine and 
the cigar; however, the concealment of their selves remains 
complete. Social interactions require people to act out a variety of 
roles on a variety of stages. Goffman terms this phenomenon 
“audience segregation”, referring to a situation in which an “actor” 
has to present different but coherent self-images to different 
audiences (Goffman 1956). 
Social psychologist Mark Snyder also found interpersonal 
differences in the extent to which we change our behaviours to suit 
the various audiences in our social circle – a phenomenon he calls 
“self-monitoring”. Someone with a high degree of self-monitoring 
will adapt their behaviour to the given situation, acting in 
accordance with the impression they are trying to give. Such 
individuals, he continues, are highly motivated to behave in a way 
that is perceived as appropriate by others (Snyder 1974). 
The fear of potential loneliness is not the only emotion an 
individual experiences in the encounter with the other; shame too is 
a sensation inextricably linked with the other’s gaze. It is the 
discomfort created when a person feels themselves transformed into 
an object. According to Sartre, the man who is ashamed is stripped 
of his humanity because he is denied the independence of being the 
looking subject rather than the looked-upon object (Sartre 1956, 
287–289), an idea which also appears in his famed play No Exit 
(1989). The play takes place in a room which, as it turns out, is 
located in hell. The three characters are led into the room at 
different points in time. The door is then locked and all three of 
them expect their torturer to arrive imminently – however, no one 
else enters the room. As their conversation evolves, it becomes clear 
that their vastly different worldviews and value systems make them 
insufferable company for one another. The unrelenting gaze of the 
others makes this situation a hell because of the fear of being 
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exposed. For a real human connection to be established, we must 
reveal our real selves, the inner part of ourselves of which we are 
often ashamed. We are terrified by the thought that there might be 
something about us which, when seen or discovered by others, will 
make us unworthy of human bonding. 
 
 
“Face Fan”, oil on canvas, 50x70 
 
In this painting, the mask, the fan, and the traditional Japanese 
costume represent a highly polite and ritualized culture, one that 
prescribes strict rules of behaviour in all aspects of life, which is why 
the persona appears attached to the fan. The mask here illustrates 
the ritual dimension of society. In this critique, Chaya Agur 
represents a faceless figure under the mask, a figure devoid of a 
unique identity, signifying that in a society which imposes its rules 
on the individual, it is challenging for the individual to make the 
distinction between societal and personal values.  
 
 
“Eve”, oil on canvas, 50x70 
 
Eve is a universal symbol – she represents the primordial shame of 
being aware of one’s genitals, which in this case, are symbolic of 
personal exposure. The figure in the painting is a modern Eve 
(judging by her hairstyle and hat) hiding her nakedness with a mask 
of personality rather than a fig leaf. Here, the painter makes the 
distinction between physical nudity, which can be concealed with a 
garment or a fig leaf, and our primal need to conceal our inner 
nudity from the world with a protective persona. The Garden of 
Eden is a formative myth in Western culture; it symbolizes the 
beginning and the aftermath, the origin of foundational patterns and 
their violation, the space of sin, retribution, and longing. Moreover, 
this myth touches upon basic universal questions, including that of 
the relationship between the individual and society, and the process 
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of revealing one’s self to the other, which is always accompanied by 
discomfort and even pain (Ritzer and Goodman 2003). This 
painting depicts, on the one hand, the origin of shame as bound up 
with self-knowledge, the same knowledge that is the source of pain 
in life outside the Garden: “And the Lord God commanded the 
man, saying: of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but 
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of 
it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die” 
(Genesis 2:16–17). On the other hand, with her modern-day styling, 
Eve in the painting represents sexual liberation and freedom from 
the need to hide one’s nudity. And yet, for Agur, despite being free 
of the requirement for bodily concealment, the persona is more 
indispensable than ever. Modern Eve represents the awareness of 
nudity in its inner sense, the exposure of one’s soul that no clothes 
can hide.  
 
 
“Changing Faces”, oil on canvas, 60x80 
 
This painting represents our ability to adapt to our surroundings and 
the general flexibility of our psyche. While some identities are fixed 
around a central trait that precludes adaptability (such as power, 
control, etc.), posing a challenge both for the individual and for the 
outside world, the fact remains that our psyche has a great capacity 
for flexibility, which can widen the rigid borders of the “self”. This 
is evident in relations based on love and mutual trust. 
In “Changing Faces”, Agur presents a comical depiction of a cat 
and its owner as a couple who have adapted to each other. A couple 
often creates a common identity that includes identical social 
preferences, reactions, values, tastes, and lifestyles – all of which 
attest to a deep physical and mental adaptation to each other, but at 
the same time a loss of individual identity. The man trains the cat to 
act more human, while he takes on catlike traits. Both are depicted 
eating the same food, which happens to be raw meat.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
In ancient Greece, the mask was a requisite theatrical convention 
that visually symbolized the art of disguising one’s self as another. 
This phenomenon was also prevalent in theatres of the Far East. 
Masks had a social, ritual, and theatrical role in the cultural history 
of different regions around the world (Mack 1994; Hershman 2014). 
Today, the mask is still a staple of global culture in theatre, festivals, 
and holidays, but over the years it has also become a metaphor for 
the variety of roles humans assume in society. As Jung argues, the 
social mask is what one dons in order to play a social role 
successfully (1916). In the social context, it is difficult for a person 
to be entirely their “true self” and so they adopt a “persona” which 
is, in fact, a “false self”. Every person has a set of masks through 
which they live. These are different types of roles that allow them 
to adapt to a particular social environment, and perhaps there is 
nothing wrong with that – that is until the mask takes over. The 
“false self” – the “social self” – may become dominant if the “true 
self” is neglected long enough.  
In this article, we examined ten paintings by artist Chaya Agur in 
order to find a contemporary, critical outlook on the role of the 
mask in the relationship between the individual and society, 
focusing in particular on modern humanity’s alienation from the 
“self”. As we saw, the faceless face and the perpetual mask are 
recurrent motifs in Agur’s paintings. The mask meant to serve 
individuals only in their relations with others ends up becoming part 
of their personality, to the point where they have no idea who they 
are behind the mask. Agur covers the faceless face of a woman with 
a hat made out of banknotes as a criticism of borrowed identity in 
the capitalist age, where the only success is financial success. In 
today’s herd mentality, made ever stronger by social networks, 
individuals are “zoomorphized” by Agur’s brush, echoing Ionesco’s 
“rhinomorphism”. In the sketch in question, humanity is a 
conformist herd of identical members devoid of any uniqueness or 
authenticity; just like the man who “fishes” his values 
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indiscriminately and whose face becomes identical to the fish, 
symbolizing the fact that his values are those of the herd.  
In “Body Language”, the painter locates our true selves on our 
bodies rather than on the masks we put on our faces. The human 
body has its own “truth”, and it cannot hide it the way we can hide 
our faces or act a part by controlling our facial expressions. “The 
Mask as an Escape from the Other’s Gaze” likewise depicts a man 
and a woman who are hiding their true identities. If, in this painting, 
the couple are aware that they are putting on masks, the couple in 
“Carnival” are oblivious to their disguises, which become their 
unconscious identity (symbolized by the faceless faces). In the next 
painting, the Japanese fan-mask highlights the universality of social 
masks across different cultures. Agur is suggesting that the more 
institutional and cultural restrictions prevent the individual from 
freely creating their true authentic self, the more permanent the 
persona becomes. Eve too represents universality as well as the 
concealment of one’s inner being. The fig leaf symbolizing bodily 
concealment cannot cover our souls from society, and we instead 
use the persona to place a protective barrier between ourselves and 
others. Finally, “Changing Faces” represents an alternative to the 
“fear from the other’s gaze”. Mutual trust made the partners 
undergo a loss of their unique identity and widen their “self’s” 
borders to include the other within it. We all suffer from the same 
“human condition”, with its unavoidable fears of loneliness and 
meaninglessness. If human society could embrace the humanist way 
and learn to lessen the pain by developing a wider “self-identity”, 
we would no longer be limited within the borders of an individual 
“self”, fighting a losing battle to keep wearing the masks of an 
illusionary, naked personality. 
 
 
NOTES 
1. The painter Chaya Agur was born in Israel and lived in the Netherlands for 35 
years. Since 1978, she has exhibited her paintings regularly in the Netherlands 
(Amsterdam, The Hague and Rosendale) and throughout Europe (Paris: The 
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World Center for Contemporary Art, Nancy: Galerie Poirel, Barcelona: 
Marlborough Art Gallery). In Israel, Agur exhibited at the Municipal Gallery in 
Afula in 2009 and at the Jerusalem Theater for the Performing Arts in 2010. From 
2002 to 2007, she ran a private gallery in central Amsterdam, “The Crane”, and 
taught painting and drawing in her private studio in The Hague for many years. 
Agur uses mixed techniques, oil paints, watercolours and drawings. Her art is 
influenced by Dali and Chagall and her style can be called symbolic surrealism. 
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